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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 07-1147

JAMIE MURRAY; SARAH MARTIN
Appellants
v.
MARINA DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
d/b/a Borgata Casino

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. No. 06-cv-00583)
District Judge: Hon. Luis Felipe Restrepo

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 (a)
March 7, 2008

Before: FISHER, GREENBERG and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed June 4, 2008)

OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge:
This case involves a claim by appellants, Jamie Murray and Sarah Martin, against
casino hotel operator, Marina District Development Co., LLC, alleging negligence for failure
to provide adequate security in the parking lot of one of its properties. Appellants contend
that the District Court erred by excluding the testimony of their casino security expert and
by failing to conduct a Daubert hearing prior to its ruling. For the reasons stated below, we
will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I. BACKGROUND
As the facts are well known to the parties, we will summarize only those pertinent to
this appeal.
On February 8, 2006, Murray and Martin filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, stating claims against Marina for
negligence in connection with an assault on them by an unidentified male in the parking lot
of Marina’s Borgata Hotel, Spa and Casino in Atlantic City, New Jersey.1 During pre-trial
discovery, Murray and Martin produced a report prepared by their expert, Andrew P. Sutor,
in which he opined that Marina was negligent because it failed to provide adequate security
at the Borgata and deviated from industry standards. While Sutor’s report cited multiple
deficiencies in the Borgata’s security system as contributing factors to the assault on Murray
and Martin, there was no identification of applicable industry standards for casino security
or discussion of the methodology employed in formulating his opinion. Moreover, at his July
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The complaint also contained a dram shop claim which appellants later dismissed.

13, 2007, deposition, Sutor acknowledged there were very few written standards in existence
for hospitality industry security and stated that he was in the process of “writing the
standards” for publication.2
On December 11, 2006, Marina filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude Sutor’s
testimony on the basis that his expert opinions were unreliable because they were not based
on any industry standards and did not purport to employ any methodology. Murray and
Martin filed a reply brief citing to Sutor’s qualifications as a security expert and asserting
that Sutor himself set the security standards for the casino industry.
On December 22, 2006, the District Court granted Marina’s motion in limine. The
District Court found that, although Sutor was qualified as an expert, his expert report and
deposition testimony “fail[ed] to demonstrate that he has a reliable methodology for
evaluating security measures in casinos given the fact that: (1) he did not cite to any
established industry standard for his opinions on requisite necessities for adequate security,
and (2) he did not provide any explanation that could be tested or subjected to peer review
as to how he reached his opinions . . ..” The District Court determined that Sutor’s testimony
at trial would be no more than a “subjective belief or unsupported speculation” rather than
“methods or procedures of science.” Accordingly, the District Court concluded that such
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When asked by Marina’s counsel “can we agree that there are no published standards
on how many [security] cameras one operator can operate at present,” he replied that “It’s
a work in progress. It’s in my book. I’m writing a book on standards.” When Marina’s
counsel asked if there were no other published standards other than his work, Sutor
responded, “Yeah, I guess so, that’s why I’m writing it.”
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testimony is unreliable under the reliability factors articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and thus inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702.
On January 4-11, 2007, a jury trial was held. At the end of trial, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of Marina. Murray and Martin appealed.
III. DISCUSSION
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Murray and Martin contend on appeal that the District Court erred when it excluded
Sutor’s expert testimony and failed to conduct a Daubert hearing. We review a district
court’s decision to exclude expert opinions for abuse of discretion. General Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997). We also review a district court's decision to decide a
motion in limine without a hearing for abuse of discretion. Kuhmo Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the District Court abused its
discretion by failing to hold a Daubert hearing before ruling on the reliability of Sutor’s
expert opinion. Although we have long recognized “the importance of in limine hearings
under Rule 104(a) in making the reliability determination required under Rule 702 and
Daubert,” it is within the discretion of a district court to determine whether such hearing is
necessary. Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 417-18 (3d Cir.1999). We have
previously recognized that failure to hold a hearing constitutes an abuse of discretion where
the evidentiary record is insufficient to allow a district court to determine what methodology
4

was employed by the expert in arriving at his conclusions. Id. at 418.
We conclude that when the District Court granted Marina’s motion in limine, it had
a sufficient factual record before it to ascertain Sutor’s methodology and make a proper
reliability determination under Daubert. See Kuhmo, 526 U.S. at 142, 152; see also Oddi v.
Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 154 (3d Cir. 2000). The record before the District Court
included Sutor’s expert report, his deposition testimony, and the parties’ briefs. Given this
record, we see no benefit in holding a Daubert hearing.
Next, we must determine whether the District Court abused its discretion in failing to
admit Sutor’s testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702 on the basis of unreliability. Rule 702
provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702 (2006) (emphasis added). The factors to be taken into consideration when
evaluating the reliability of a particular methodology include:
(1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; (2) whether the method
has been subject to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation;
(5) whether the method is generally accepted; (6) the relationship of the
technique to methods which have been established to be reliable; (7) the
qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on the methodology; and
(8) the non-judicial uses to which the method has been put.
Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 745-46 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing U.S. v. Downing, 753
5

F.2d 1224, 1238-41) (3d Cir. 1985)). As we recognized in Elcock, “this list is non-exclusive
and . . . each factor need not be applied in every case.” Id. at 746.
After careful review of the record and consideration of the Daubert reliability factors,
we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Sutor’s opinions.
In particular, we agree that Sutor’s report and deposition testimony fail to demonstrate any
methodology, let alone peer-reviewed or generally accepted methodology, underlying his
opinion that the Borgata security system was inadequate and constituted a deviation from
industry standards. While Sutor’s report identifies purported security deficiencies, he fails
to identify the source of any industry standards, obligations or duties allegedly applicable to
Marina or provide the methodology he used to arrive at his opinions. Furthermore, when
questioned at his deposition regarding the existence of casino security industry standards,
Sutor responded that there were “very few” standards and he was writing the standards for
the industry, but that it was a “work in progress.” Accordingly, we agree that Sutor’s
testimony would be no more than a “subjective belief or unsupported speculation,” rather
than “methods or procedures of science,” see Oddi, 234 F.3d at 158, and thus would not
assist the jury in understanding or determining a fact in issue, as required under Fed. R. Evid.
702 and Daubert.

IV. CONCLUSION
Because we conclude there was no abuse of discretion, we will affirm the judgment
of the District Court.
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